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Lie Detection: THE SUPREME
COURT'S POLYGRAPH DECISION
By BENNETT

L.

GERSHMAN

etecting deception by examining bodily changes is not
a new phenomenon. More
than 4,000 years ago the
Chinese tried an accused in
the presence of a physician who, listening to the heartbeat, would announce
whether the accused was lying. The
bedouins required suspected liars to lick
a hot iron-a burned tongue was a sign
oflying. In England the test was to swalIowa "trial slice" of bread and cheeseinability to swallow revealed deception.!
Modern lie detection operates
roughly on the same principle. Questions
are put to the subject by a qualified examiner while a polygraph device monitors and records internal stresses from
changes in blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration rate and perspiration. A comparison of responses to "control" questions
("Did you have breakfast?") with "relevant" questions ("Did you use drugs?")
may reveal that the subject is lying. 2
Although the rate of accuracy of
polygraph testing is claimed to range
from 70% to well over 90%,3 American
courts traditionally have been hostile to
the admission of any evidence concerning the administration or results of a
polygraph examination. For fifty years
since Frye v. United States,4 the seminal
polygraph case, virtually all courts adhered to a rule of unconditional exclusion. 5 Inadmissibility was based on the
unreliability of the test, the lack of standardized procedures, and the prejudicial
impact on the jury. Principal concerns
articulated by courts have been (1) the
aura of infallibility of such evidence, (2)
resistance to admitting an opinion on an
ultimate issue, (3) infringement on the
jury's role in determining credibility, and
(4) undue consumption of judicial resources from such testimony.6
In United States v. Scheffer,? decided this past Term, the Supreme Court
considered for the first time the admis-
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sibility of polygraph evidence. 8 The
Court held that exclusion of such evidence on behalf of a criminal defendant
was supported by valid justifications and
offended no constitutional right to
present a defense. The case produced
three opinions. The principal opinion by
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Souter,
reflected the traditional hostility to polygraph evidence and articulated the traditional justifications for categorical
exclusion. A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer, while
agreeing with the result, criticized much
of the reasoning in the principal opinion
and adopted a more nuanced approach
to the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Justice Stevens, in a powerful dissent, noted the incongruity between the
government's extensive use of polygraphs to make vital security determinations and its argument in Scheffer
stressing the inaccuracy of the tests.
Given the obvious tension between
Scheffer and the Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 9 on the admissibility
of scientific evidence generally, the discomfort by five Justices over a categorical rule of exclusion, and the modem
trend of limited admissibility of polygraph evidence, it is likely that the Court
will again revisit the admissibility of
polygraph evidence in a different factual context, and the result next time
might well be different.

Background
Scheffer, an airman, was tried by a
court-martial on charges of knowingly
using methamphetamine. A urinalysis
indicated that he had ingested the substance, but his defense was that he was
unaware of the ingestion. He so testified, and attempted to support his testimony by introducing the results of a lie
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detector test which was administered to
him at the government's request, and
which in the opinion of the government's
polygraph examiner confirmed the truthfulness of Scheffer's testimony. Although the prosecution had selected the
polygraph examiner, the equipment, the
testing procedures, and the questions
asked of the defendant, and argued
throughout the trial that Scheffer "is a
liar," it objected to the admissibility of
the polygraph results, citing Military
Rule of Evidence 707,10 which categori1 McCormick on Evidence § 206, at
U. Strong 4th ed. 1992).
2 Moenssens, Inbau & Starrs, Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases, § 14.07, at 704·
07 (3d ed. 1986).
3 Id. § 14.09, at 712. See also United
States v. Oliver, 525 F. 2d 731, 737 (8th
Cir. 1975) (expert polygrapher testifies to
accuracy rate over 90%).
4293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5 New York is one of the jurisdictions
adopting the per se rule of exclusion. See
People v. Leone, 25 N.Y. 2d 511 (1969).
6 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.
2d 1529, 1532-33 (11 th Cir. 1989); Brown
v. Darcy, 783 F. 2d 1389, 1396-97 (9th Cir.
1986). Notwithstanding the general rule of
exclusion, prosecutors have committed
reversible misconduct by eliciting proof that
the defendant failed the test, United States v.
Brevard, 739 F. 2d 180 (4th Cir. 1984), that
a key witness passed the test, Commonwealth
v. Kemp, 410 A. 2d 870 (Pa. Super. 1979),
or indirectly proving that the witness took the
test, leaving the inescapable inference that the
witness passed the test. State v. Kilpatrick,
578 P. 2d 1147 (Kan. 1978); People v.
Brocato, 169 N.W. 2d 483 (Mich. 1969).
Even proof of a witness' Willingness or
unwillingness to take a lie detector test is
error. United States v. Martino, 648 F. 2d
367 (5th Cir. 1981).
7118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
B In Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7
(1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a state
prosecutor's failure to disclose to the defense
that a key prosecution witness had failed a
polygraph test did not deprive of exculpatory
evidence. The Court noted that" disclosure of
the poly_graph results could have had no
direct effect on the outcome of the trial,
because [the defense] could have made no
mention of them either during argument or
while questioning witnesses." Id. at 10.
9 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See United States
v. Cordoba, 104 F. 3d 225, 227 (9th Cir.
1997) (" a per se rule excluding polygraph
evidence was overruled by Daubed'); United
States v. Posado, 57 F. 3d 428, 431-34 (5th
Cir. 1995) (Daubert "remove[d] the obstacle
of the per se rule against admissibility").
10 Rule 707 states: "(a) Notwithstanding any
other provision of the law, the results of a
polygraph examination, the opinion of a
polygraph examiner, or any reference to an
offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a
polygraph examination, shall not be admitted
into evidence." There is no counterpart to
Military Rule of Evidence 707 in the Federal
Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
1
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cally excludes polygraph evidence. The
military judge sustained the objection,
and the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed en bancY However,
the United States Court of Military Appeals reversed, holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered
by an accused to rebut an attack on his
credibility violates his Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense. 12

Supreme Court Opinions
The principal opinion by Justice
Thomas began by noting the familiar
principle that the right to present evidence is subject to reasonable restrictions, and that rules excluding evidence
will be upheld so long as they are not
"arbitrary" or "disproportionate" to the
purposes they are designed to serve.13
Rule 707' s categorical ban on polygraph
evidence serves several legitimate purposes, according to the principal opinion, including (1) ensuring that only
reliable evidence is introduced at trial,
(2) preserving the jury's role in determining credibility, and (3) avoiding litigation into collateral issues. Given the
fact that "the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques," the
risk that juries will give excessive weight
to the opinions of a polygrapher, and
the time-consuming "collateral" litigation over the admissibility of polygraph
evidence, exclusion of such evidence "is
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in
promoting these ends."14 The Court also
held that Rule 707 does not implicate
any "significant" or "sufficiently
weighty" interest of the defendant, and
therefore is distinguishable from the
Court's precedents invalidating on constitutional grounds evidentiary rules that
excluded a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony,15 an accomplice's testimony,16 and a third party's confession. 17
Here, Scheffer was neither prevented
from testifying in his own behalf, nor
precluded from introducing any factual
evidence to prove his innocence. Scheffer
"was barred merely from introducing
expert opinion testimony to bolster his
own credibility."18
The concurring opinion of Justice
Kennedy agreed that the ban on polygraph evidence served the legitimate interest of ensuring that only reliable
evidence be presented to a fact-finder,
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and that given the disagreement in the
legal and scientific community about the
reliability of polygraph evidence, the
exclusionary rule "is not so arbitrary or
disproportionate that it is unconstitutional."19 Nevertheless, the Kennedy
opinion doubted the "wisdom" of a per
se rule of exclusion, and argued that
given the broad discretion of federal
judges under Daubert in admitting or
excluding scientific evidence, a "more
compelling" case for the admissibility
of polygraph evidence might be presented in the future. 2o
The Kennedy opinion emphatically
disagreed with the principal opinion's
assertion that a per se ban is appropriate
in order to preserve the jury's role in
making credibility determinations and in
avoiding litigation into peripheral issues.
The Kennedy opinion accused the principal opinion of "overreach[ing]" in arguing that the jury's role is "diminished"
by the introduction of polygraph evidence. 21 Such claim is particularly inapt
in the context of the military justice system given the extensive qualifications of
military court members and the lessened
risk that such members will be unduly
influenced by opinion testimony from
experts. The Kennedy opinion also rejected as "empty rhetoric" the "tired argument" against allowing juries to hear
a conclusion about an ultimate issue. 22
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion
made two arguments. First, he contended
that Rule 707 violates Article 36(a) of
the Unifonn Code of Military Justice,
which authorizes the President to prescribe rules for military proceedings relating to special areas of procedural or
evidentiary concem. 23 However, according to Justice Stevens, "there is no identifiable military concern that justifies the
President's promulgation of a special
military rule that is more burdensome to
defendants in military trials than the
evidentiary rules applicable to the trial
of civilians."24
Second, a blanket exclusion of potentially relevant evidence violates a
defendant's firmly established constitutional right to present a complete defense
with relevant and reliable proof. Justice
Stevens referred to a host of studies placing the reliability of polygraph tests at
between 85% to 90%, with critics placing polygraph accuracy at 70%.25 Moreover, polygraph accuracy is probably

greater than other types of admissible evidence, such as an expert's testimony on a
defendant's "future dangerousness" in
41 M.J. 683 (1995) (en banc).
44 M.J. 442, 445 (1996).
13 118 S. Ct. at 1265.
14 118 S. Ct. at 1265.
15 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
16 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967).
17 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973).
1B 118 S. Ct. at 1268-69.
19 118 S. Ct. at 1269.
11

12

20
21

Jd.
Jd. ("the argument demeans and mistakes

the role and competence of jurors in deciding
the factual question of guilt or innocence").
22 118 S. Ct. at 1269-70. The concurring
opinion observed that Rule 704(a) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence specifically allows
opinions on ultimate issues. The concurring
opinion also referred to the Advisory
CommiHee's Notes to Rule 704, which
observes that the stricture against allowing
witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate
issues was "unduly restrictive" and "served
only to deprive the trier of fact of useful
information."
23 See 10 U.S.c. § 836(a), which
authorizes the President to promulgate
evidentiary rules "which shall, so far as
practicable, apply the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in
the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts."
24 118 S. Ct. 1272.
25 118 S. Ct. at 1276 n. 21.
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11111
capital sentencing proceedings,26 or the
notoriously unreliable testimony of eyewitnesses.27 Moreover, the belief that
polygraph evidence will overpersuade a
fact-finder "reflects a distressing lack of
confidence in the intelligence of the average American."28 Finally, no undue
waste of judicial resources will be occasioned by polygraph evidence. Indeed,
according to Justice Stevens, preliminary
proceedings on the admissibility of evidence is a routine predicate for the admission of all sorts of expert testimony.29
And there would have been no need for
collateral proceedings in Scheffer's case
since the governrnent selected the examiner, the equipment and the questions
asked of the defendant, and has used the
identical procedures in hundreds of thousands of other cases. 30

Modem Trend of Limited
Admissibility
Scheffer arrives at a time when
courts are increasingly departing from
Frye's restrictive approach in favor of a
more flexible, balanced approach to the
admissibility of polygraph evidence.
Scheffer essentially maintains the status
quo. After Scheffer, courts are not barred
from continuing to experiment with increasing scientific advances in polygraph
instrumentation and technique. 3! Moreover, Frye has been superseded in the
federal courts by the landmark opinion
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. 32 which holds that the "rigid"
Frye standard is incompatible with the
"liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules of
Evidence toward the admissibility of scientific evidence. 33 If Scheffer had invalidated the per se ban of Rule 707, the
Court would have invalidated the restrictive approach of most state courts and
sent a message to federal courts to exercise broader discretion in favor of polygraph admissibility.
Under current practice, polygraph
evidence or the fact that a polygraph test
was administered is admitted under several theories. First, references to a polygraph test are admissible when the
evidence is introduced for a purpose
other than proving the result of the test.
Thus, statements made by a defendant
prior to, during the course of, or after
taking a polygraph are generally admissible. 34 Statements may also be admissible when an adverse expert has
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considered and discounted them in arriving at an opinion on a defendant's
mental condition. 35 Finally, references to
a polygraph test are allowed when the
evidence is used to demonstrate an operative fact, such as proving the
voluntariness of a confession,36 explaining why the police failed to conduct a
more thorough investigation,37 or proving the existence of an alibi. 38
Second, under the guidelines established in Daubert, federal courts have admitted the result of a polygraph test for
substantive purposes. Examples include
rebutting an attack on the defendant's
credibility as a witness,39 supporting the
defendant's contention that he lacked the
culpable mental state for the crime,40 negating an element in the prosecution's
case,4! or impeaching the credibility of a
key prosecution witness. 42 To these courts,
the argument that juries will be overwhelmed by polygraph evidence is overstated and underestimates the effect of
vigorous cross-examination and argument
in exposing flaws in the testing process.
Admission of polygraph evidence is also
subject to safeguards such as requiring
the party seeking to use the evidence to
give notice to the adversary, allowing the
opposing party to conduct his own examination covering the same questions,
and using the proof only in conformity
with appropriate rules of evidence governing impeachment and rehabilitation. 43
Third, polygraph evidence is
admitted in most federal circuits and
many state courts by stipulation of the
26 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
898·901 (1983) (expert testimony about
future dangerousness to determine a
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty is
wrong "most of the time" but still admitted in
evidence).
27 See Huff, Rattner & Sagarin, Guilty Until

Proved Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and
Public Policy, 32 Crime & Delinquency 518,
524 (1986) (study of wrongful convictions
concludes that eyewitness misidentification is
the single most important factor leading to
conviction); Widacki & Horvath, An

Experimental investigation of the Relative
Validity and Utility of the Polygraph Technique
and Three Other Common Methods of
Criminal Identification, 23 J. Forensic Sciences
596, 596-600 (1978) (polygraph evidence
compares favorably with fingerprint,
handwriting, and eyewitness evidence).
28 118 S. Ct. at 1278 (research indicates
that "jurors do not blindly accept polygraph
evidence, but that they weigh polygraph evidence along with other evidence").
29 118 S. Ct. at 1278 ("If testimony that is
critical to a fair determination of guilt or innocence could be excluded for that reason, the
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right to a meaningful opportunity to present a
defense would be an illusion").
30 Id. Between 1981 and 1997, the Department of Defense conducted over 400,000
polygraph examinations to resolve issues arising in counterintelligence, security, and criminal investigations. See Department of Defense
Polygraph Program, Annual Polygraph Report
to Congress. Moreover, as Justice Stevens argued, "the Government is in no position to argue that one who has successfully completed
its carefully developed training program is unqualified." 118 S. Ct. at 1278.
31 See U.S. v. Gilliard, 133 F. 3d 809
(11 th Cir. 1998) (trial court properly excluded
polygraph evidence because hybrid control
question technique not shown to be reliable).
It should be noted that if a defendant is allowed to introduce exculpatory polygraph evidence, a prosecutor may also be allowed to
introduce inculpatory test results to prove consciousness of guilt. See United States v.
Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1279 n. 29 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("I can see nothing fundamentally unfair about permitting the results of a
test taken pursuant to stipulation being admitted into evidence to prove consciousness of
guilt as well as consciousness of innocence").
32 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
33 Applying a plain meaning approach to
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Court in Daubert held that Rule 702 required
district courts to determine that expert testimony relating to scientific evidence will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a
Fact in issue. The first question to be determined is whether the testimony constitutes "scientific knowledge." The Court provided several criteria to guide judges in making that
determination, including (1) whether the
theory or technique has been tested, (2)
whether the theory or tech nique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the
known or potential rate aF error, (4) the existence or maintenance of standards controlling
the technique's operation, and (5) whether the
technique is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. 509 U.S. at 59293. The second question under Dallbert is
whether the testimony will assist the trier of
fact, that is, whether the testimony relates to
an issue that is actually in dispute and
whether such testimony provides a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry. Id. at
591.
34 See State v. Hart, 791 P. 2d 125 (Or.
1990); People v. Ray, 430 N.W. 2d 626
(Mich. 1988); State v. Erickson, 403 N.W.
2d 281 (Minn. App. 1987).
35

See United States v. A&S Council Oil

Co., 947 F. 2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991).
36 United States v. Miller, 874 F. 2d 1255
(9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Johnson,
816 F. 2d 918 (3d Cir. 1987); People v.
Melock, 599 N.E. 2d 941 (III. 1992).
37 United States v. Hall, 805 F. 2d 1410
(10th Cir. 1986).
38 United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp.
1354 (D. Ariz. 1995).
39 See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F. 3d
225 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 13654 (D. Ariz.
1995).
40 See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F.
SURP' 877 (D.N.M. 1995).
1 See United States v. Posado, 57 F. 3d
428 (5th Cir. 1995).
42 United States v. A&S Council Oil Co.,
947 F. 2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991).
43 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.
2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989).

parties. 44 The parties must agree to material matters, such
as the manner in which the test is conducted, the identity
of the examiner, the nature of the questions asked, and the
purpose for which the test will be introduced. 45 Courts
typically require the stipulation to be written, signed, and
a matter of record, afford the opposing side a broad opportunity to cross-examine the expert as to his qualifications and the limitations of polygraph testing, and give a
limiting instruction to the jury as to the evidentiary purpose of the testimony.46
Fourth, polygraph evidence has been admitted under
the evidentiary rule that allows a party to impeach or rehabilitate a witness through opinion or reputation evidence
with respect to the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness. 47 For example, if a defendant took the stand
and denied having committed the crime, and the prosecutor
impeached his credibility, the defendant would be permitted to rehabilitate his credibility by introducing polygraph
evidence that demonstrated his character for truthfulness. 48
Moreover, a defendant could support his own credibility by
stating that he passed a polygraph examination in connection with the case. 49
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Conclusion
In those jurisdictions that do not unconditionally foreclose the admission of polygraph evidence and allow the
court to use discretion with respect to the introduction of
scientific evidence, Scheffer will not stand in the way of the
continued use of polygraph evidence. Moreover, to the extent that a majority of the Supreme Court apparently disapproves of a per se rule of polygraph exclusion, Scheffer
supports a balanced and flexible approach to the use of
polygraph evidence under rigorous standards and safeguards.
Several federal and state courts have allowed the use of
polygraph evidence in various contexts noted above, and
probably will continue to do so. Although per se rules of
exclusion presently do not offend constitutional principles,
the emerging body of constitutional doctrine protecting a
defendant's right to present relevant evidence to support a
defense may one day include a limited right to present
~
polygraph evidence.
44 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 2d at 1534 nn. 16,
17. By contrast, a privately commissioned polrgraph test which is
nknown, to either until after its completion is 0 extremely dubious
probative value. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F. 3d 1208 (6th
Cir. 1995); Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F. 3d 658 (6th Cir.
1994) .•
45 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 2d at 1536.
46 See State v. Marti, 290 N.W. 2d 570 (Iowa 1980); Codie v.
State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975); State v. Valdez, 371 P. 2d
894 (Ariz. 1962). But see State v. Boyd, 673 N.E. 2d 607, 611
(Ohio "xpp. 1996) (agreement by parties that polygraph examiner
may not be examined concerning possibilities for error in testing
process!violates public policy as giving jury misimpression that
examiner's opinion was sacrosanct).
47 Se~ Fed. R. Evid. 608(a).
48 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 2d at 1536; United
States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1363. But see United States v.
Castillo) 1997 WL 83746 .n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting view that
p0!rgraph expert opines as to witness' truthful character).
4 See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1364 (testimony a8missible under "impeachment by contradiction" exception
to Fed. IR. Evid. 608(b)).
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